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ABSTRACT
After providing a legal characterization of the open
patenting phenomenon and discussing many of the empirical
and theoretical experiences that relate to both Open Innovation
and defensive patenting, this paper suggests standardized terms
and conditions that a patent license should contain in order to
foster both the free movement of patented knowledge and its
business applications.
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INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the great interest that Open Innovation is
currently brewing,1 this paper builds on the legal definition of
© 2013 Mariateresa Maggiolino & Maria Lillà Montagnani
Mariateresa Maggiolino is Assistant Professor of Commercial Law at
Bocconi University, Department of Legal Studies, Milan; Maria Lillà
Montagnani is Associate Professor of Commercial Law at Bocconi University,
Department of Legal Studies, Milan. Both are faculty members of the Art,
Science and Knowledge (ASK) research centre, Bocconi University, Milan.
Although the paper was born from their common elaboration, Parts II.A and
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the Open Patenting phenomenon that we proposed in a
previous work, From Open Source Software to Open Patenting:
What’s New in the Realm of Openness?,2 to spell out the clauses
that a standard license should contain in order to foster Open
Innovation. To do this, we analyze some of the main
experiences that fall under our label of Open Patenting and two
very recent theoretical licensing schemes that advocate a
defensive use of patent portfolios.3
A few years ago, by analyzing various open licensing
schemes that patentees adopted (and still adopt) across
different scientific sectors,4 we gleaned that Open Patenting,
although born to counter many philosophical, economic, and
technical problems concerning innovation, is essentially a legal
phenomenon.5 It establishes standardized contractual terms
III are attributable to Mariateresa Maggiolino, while Parts I, II.B and II.C are
attributable to Maria Lillà Montagnani.
1. See, e.g., HENRY CHESBROUGH, OPEN INNOVATION: THE NEW
IMPERATIVE FOR CREATING AND PROFITING FROM TECHNOLOGY 43 (2003);
Open Innovator’s Toolkit, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
open/toolkit (last visited Feb. 7, 2013) (providing guidelines and tools to
encourage Open Innovation using government data).
2. Mariateresa Maggiolino & M. Lillà Montagnani, From Open Source
Software to Open Patenting: What’s New in the Realm of Openness?, 42 INT’L
REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 804, 829–30 (2011).
3. These schemes—named Defensive Patent Model (DPL) and Modified
Defensive Patent Model (MDPL)—have been proposed and discussed in the
following papers, respectively: Jason Schultz & Jennifer M. Urban, Protecting
Open Innovation: The Defensive Patent License as a New Approach to Patent
Threats, Transaction Costs, and Tactical Disarmament, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
1, 37–41 (2012); see generally David L. Hayes & C. Eric Schulman, A Response
to a Proposal for a Defensive Patent License (DPL) (Feb. 4, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2054314.
4. These include the different licensing schemes we refer to as the Open
Source Software (OSS) Licenses, which were adopted for the development of
open source software, and the Creative Commons (CC) Licenses, which were
adopted for the circulation of copyright content. Among the wide literature on
the topic see the recent empirical work: Jay P. Kesan, The Fallacy of OSS
Discrimination by FRAND Licensing: An Empirical Analysis 7–12 (Univ. of Ill.
Coll. of Law Ill. Pub. Law, Paper No. 10-14, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1767083 (illustrating the eight most popular OSS licenses). See
generally Niva Elkin-Koren, Exploring Creative Commons: A Skeptical View of
a Worthy Pursuit, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE
COMMONS IN INFORMATION LAW 325 (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz
eds., 2006) (regarding the CC phenomenon and, more generally, the
proliferation of open licenses).
5. See generally Maggiolino & Montagnani, supra note 2 (describing the
evolution of open source software licensing schemes in the context of their
purposes and philosophical underpinnings).
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and conditions for managing patents to, on the one hand,
prevent free riding and, on the other hand, facilitate access to,
transfer of, and use of patented knowledge.6 More recently, an
interesting academic debate resulted in the publication of two
licensing schemes that support the use of patent licenses as
tools both to defend Open Innovation against misappropriation
and to promote, among the inner circle of licensors and
licensees, freedom to operate and innovate and a greater ability
to navigate the patent thicket.7 Therefore, although the old and
new practical experiences analyzed here (discussed in Part
II.A) and the theoretical models elaborated by academia
(discussed in Part II.B) endorse quite different visions of what
openness is and should be (discussed in Part II.C), after
analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of these licensing
schemes as well as their similarities and differences, we
propose a model for Open Patenting licenses (discussed in Part
II.D). In particular, our Open Patenting license model provides
a high degree of standardization without forgetting that many
patentees need to tailor their open licenses to their individual
business wants and needs.
I. DEFINING OPEN PATENTING AS THE PRACTICE
OF LICENSING PATENTS UNDER STANDARDIZED
TERMS AND CONDITIONS
The many and varied experiences that are labeled “Open
Innovation” diverge significantly with regard to what they
“open”; indeed, it takes only a few cases to show how the realm
of Open Innovation is articulated in a multiplicity of ways. For
instance, whereas the FightAIDS@Home project “opens”
computer capacity to efficiently supply spare hardware to
whoever is interested in researching and experimenting on the
HIV virus,8 the Innovation Portal is the tool whereby Procter &

6. Id. at 823.
7. See supra note 3 regarding the DPL and the MDPL, and our analysis
of these licenses, infra Part II.B.
8. See Alex L. Perryman, Fight Aids @ Home, SCRIPPS RES. INST.,
http://fightaidsathome.scripps.edu/ (last updated Dec. 3, 2012). Another
example of Open Hardware is the Open Source Hardware Association—see
OSHWA, http://www.oshwa.org/ (last visited May 14, 2013)—that brings
together inventors and designers who want to make their devices publicly
available so that anyone can study, modify, distribute, make, and sell them
and their improvements. Likewise, the Ohanda initiative—see Open Source
Hardware and Design Alliance, OH&A, http://www.ohanda.org/ (last visited
Apr. 24, 2013)—pools together, under the “Ohanda” label, inventors and
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Gamble “opens” its doors to whoever is interested in submitting
a patented innovation that matches the specific innovative
needs that the company is expressly interested in having
satisfied.9 Likewise, whereas some projects—such as PLoS,10
ArXiv,11 SourgeForge,12 HapMap,13 and BLAST14—“open”
scientific journals, repositories, and databases that store and
aggregate tools and data to guarantee free and easy access to
basic knowledge,15 Open Source Software16 (OSS) and Creative
designers who want to release their innovations by allowing third parties to:
(1) use the invented device; (2) access it and study its functionality; (3)
redistribute it; and (4) modify it, improve it, and release the improvements to
the public. In order to use the “Ohanda” label on modified or derivative
hardware, third parties must register with Ohanda and release the
improvements under the Ohanda licensing conditions.
9. See Inova Suite, PROCTER & GAMBLE, https://pgconnectdevelop.
inovasuite.com/pg/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2013). For a list of the innovation
needs that Proctor & Gamble wants to see satisfied, see Innovation Needs,
PROCTER & GAMBLE, http://www.pg.com/connect_develop/ pg_innovation/
innovation_portal.shtml (last visited Jan. 28, 2013). Indeed, one of the first
definitions of Open Innovation—a definition associated with the literature
about knowledge management—pivoted around the idea that companies must
look beyond their walls for new products and processes. See CHESBROUGH,
supra note 1.
10. See PUB. LIBR. SCI., http://www.plos.org/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2013).
11. See ARXIV, http://arxiv.org/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2013).
12. See SOURCEFORGE, http://sourceforge.net/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2013).
13. See About the HapMap, INT’L HAPMAP PROJECT, http://www.
hapmap.org/thehapmap.html.en (last visited Jan. 28, 2013).
14. See BLAST: Basic Local Alignment Search Tool, NAT’L CTR. FOR
BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO., http://blast.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/Blast.cgi (last visited Jan.
28, 2013).
15. For a discussion of the connection between “open science” and
databases—that is to say, of the relationship between openness and wellorganized, exhaustive, and freely accessible storages of basic (upstream)
information—see generally STEPHEN M. MAURER, NEW INSTITUTIONS FOR
DOING SCIENCE: FROM DATABASES TO OPEN SOURCE BIOLOGY (2003),
available at http://www.epip.eu/papers/20031124/200411_conference/papers/
maurer_paper.pdf. This paper was presented to the European Policy for
Intellectual Property Conference on Copyright and database protection,
patents and research tools, and other challenges to the intellectual property
system on November 24–25, 2003. Id.
16. See What is GNU?, GNU OPERATING SYSTEMS, http://www.gnu.org/
home.en.html (last updated Jan. 19, 2013). OSS has many applications in the
domains of bioinformatics, genomics, and synthetic biology; for example,
BioPerl and BioJava make their work available under variants of the GNU
General Public License (GPL). See Licensing BioPerl, BIOPERL,
http://www.bioperl.org/wiki/Licensing_BioPerl (last visited Feb. 23, 2013)
(dual license under Perl Artistic License and GNU GPL); BioJava:License,
BIOJAVA, http://biojava.org/wiki/BioJava:License (last visited Feb. 23, 2013)
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Commons17 (CC) licenses “open” the copyrights covering the
innovation and creativity in question (whether that be
computer source code that is protected by copyright, or a
copyrighted creative work) in order to allow the aggregation,
sharing, and ongoing modification of the protected innovation
itself.
Against this backdrop, and on the basis of the Open
Patenting experiences we analyzed in our previous work,18 we
defined Open Patenting as the legal phenomenon or the legal
practice that—in the wake of Open Source Software and
Creative Commons—“opens” patents by licensing them via a
standardized contractual scheme that is different from the
traditional proprietary one.19 In particular, we discovered that
the preference for licenses rests upon a few facts: first and
foremost, since intellectual property rights (IPRs) are both
exclusive and inclusive rights,20 licenses are the quintessential
tools both for supporting technology transfer and for opening
up the innovative processes that underpin (and result from)
patents.21 Moreover, in the United States, patent licenses may
(Lesser GPL version 2.1). Compare these to Biopython License Agreement,
BIOPYTHON, http://www.biopython.org/DIST/LICENSE (last visited Feb. 23,
2013) (granting permission to “use, copy, modify, and distribute [the] software
and its documentation with or without modifications and for any purpose and
without fee,” without requiring that modifications be distributed under the
same license), which is arguably more liberal than copyleft licenses. For a full
description of the licenses employed for biology software, see Stephen M.
Maurer, Open Source Drug Discovery: Finding a Niche (or Maybe Several), 76
UMKC L. REV. 405, 405 (2007). See also Mélanie Dulong de Rosnay, Check
Your Data Freedom: A Taxonomy to Assess Life Science Database Openness
(Harvard Law Sch. Berkman Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y, Working Paper No.
2008-5,
2008),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1531387.
17. See About, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org (last
visited Jan. 25, 2013). See generally Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Can’t
Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a Creative Commons, 74
FORDHAM L. REV 375, 378 (2005) (underlining how the strategic choice,
carried out through the adoption of Creative Commons licenses, of relying on
property rights in its effort to subvert the meaning of copyright may have the
opposite effect of strengthening the proprietary regime in creative works);
Michel Carroll, Creative Commons and the New Intermediaries, 45 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 45 (2006) (contemplating the re-intermediating roles of Creative
Commons licenses).
18. See Maggiolino & Montagnani, supra note 2, at 822.
19. See id. at 829.
20. See GUSTAVO GHIDINI, INNOVATION, COMPETITION AND CONSUMER
WELFARE IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 1–30 (2010).
21. See Roya Ghafele & Robert D. O’Brien, Open Innovation for
Sustainability: Lessons from the GreenXchange Experience (Munich Personal
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be easier to enforce than pledges, not only because they do not
need to rely on judicial doctrines such as promissory estoppel or
implied license to be binding, but also because licenses are not
under the sole control of the patentee.22 Likewise, we noted
that the focus on standardization arises from a simple economic
observation: standardized licenses serve to reduce the concerns
and costs associated with both the process of developing followon innovations and the process of trading patents23 by reducing
transaction costs.24 Thanks to this standardized approach, it is
easier and safer for companies not only to conduct research on
existing patents and their possible improvements, but also to
acquire licenses for patents that match their business needs
and sell licenses for patents that are not necessary for the
development of their businesses.25

RePEc Archive, Working Paper No. 4044, 2012), available at
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/40440/1/MPRA_paper_40440.pdf.
22. See Schultz & Urban, supra note 3, at 32. See generally OPEN SOURCE
DEVELOPMENT LABS, UNDERSTANDING PATENT PLEDGES: AN OVERVIEW OF
LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS (2006), available at http://www.patentcommons.org/
publications/OSDL_Whitepaper_Final_final_4-12-06.pdf
(describing
the
doctrines of implied license, equitable estoppel, and laches as applied to patent
disputes). Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006) (describing the exclusive rights of patent
owners under United States law).
23. See MARIATERESA MAGGIOLINO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF US AND EU LAW 36–37
(2011) (“Especially in industries characterized by cumulative knowledge
and/or overlapping cross-market knowledge, it is likely that patents and
copyrights on prior innovation can decrease R&D incentives and block future
innovation.” (citations omitted)). However, the IPR holder’s right to control
follow-on innovations is likely to be stronger when the IPR in question is a
copyright, because of the right to create derivative works, than when it is a
patent. Indeed, copyrights encompass the right to authorize derivative works,
or, rather, the right to authorize commercial exploitation of derivative works.
See Julie E. Cohen, Copyright, Commodification, and Culture: Locating the
Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE
COMMONS IN INFORMATION LAW 121 (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz
eds., 2006) (defining copyright as “the right to control the preparation and
exploitation of copies and derivative works”).
24. See Maggiolino & Montagnani, supra note 2, at 822–23; see also, e.g.,
Reiko Aoki & Aaron Schiff, Promoting Access to Intellectual Property: Patent
Pools, Copyright Collectives, and Clearinghouses, 38 R&D MGMT. 189, 197
(2008) (comparing the economic features of IP access systems).
25. See, e.g., Maggiolino & Montagnani, supra note 2, at 824–25
(describing the goals and benefits of the GreenXchange project and license).
Licensed as such, patents would be used by those who value them most, which
would be consistent with a strategy optimize social welfare.
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Finally, since all of the examples we have analyzed share
the quality of being internet-based, it must be acknowledged
that the Open Patenting phenomenon has occurred in the
online environment. There, higher degrees of disclosure and
easier searches facilitate alignment between supply and
demand for existing patents; hasten the spread of knowledge,
speeding up innovative processes (including those concerning
cumulative innovation); and reduce the transaction costs
associated with the organization and management of
traditional patent joint ventures, cross-licenses, and pools.26
Therefore, in our view, Open Patenting is different from
other Open Innovation systems that emphasize the
aggregation, sharing, and modification of scientific knowledge
and innovations but do not contemplate patented inventions or
standardized contractual clauses. For example, it is different
from the so-called Public Patent Foundation,27 which seeks to
protect the public domain by challenging improperly granted
patents (i.e., by asking the U.S. Patent Office to revoke an
issued patent on the grounds that its underlying idea is not
novel).28 Yet Open Patenting is also different from the current
initiatives aimed at funding research about tropical diseases,
such as Tropical Disease Initiative (Tdi) and Drugs for
Neglected Disease Initiative (DNDi).29 The former is a webbased community of scientists that does not patent its
inventions; rather, it allows those inventions to fall into the
public domain, because it wants to induce a broad and
generalized reduction in patent royalties.30 Likewise, the DNDi

26. See generally, e.g., Gary Dushnitsky & Thomas Klueter, Is There an
eBay for Ideas? Insights from Online Knowledge Marketplaces, 8 EUR. MGMT.
REV. 17 (2011) (examining online knowledge marketplaces that foster
disclosure of innovations and reduce information search costs).
27. See About PUBPAT, PUB. PAT. FOUND., http://www.pubpat.org/
About.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2013).
28. See Protecting the Public Domain, PUB. PAT. FOUND., http://
www.pubpat.org/Protecting.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2013).
29. See TROPICAL DISEASE INITIATIVE, http://tropicaldisease.org (last
visited Jan. 26, 2013); Leticia Ortí et al., A Kernel for Open Source Drug
Discovery in Tropical Diseases, 3 PLOS: NEGLECTED TROPICAL DISEASES, Apr.
2009, at 1, 1–2, 8–9.
30. See Ortí et al., supra note 29, at 1–2, 8–9. This strategy suggests that
TDi does not worry about parasitic patenting; it does not impose any sort of
viral clause upon researchers who will use its results, thereby allowing third
parties to patent follow-on innovations that embody its results without
requiring those third parties to share the follow-on innovations. The TDi
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is a collaborative, patients’ needs-driven, non-profit drug
research and development organization, which does not accept
projects in which IPRs present an insurmountable barrier to
follow-on research. On the other hand, Open Patenting is also
different from other Open Innovation projects that, while
addressing patented innovations, do not standardize the terms
and conditions of the license(s) attached to the collected
patents. For instance, PatentCommons,31 born with the
intention of responding to the software patent threat,32 and
supported by the Linux foundation,33 works as a “facilitator” of
patent trade by offering an online library of 500 software
patents whose sixteen owners make those patents available to
third parties on individualized terms and conditions that are
publicly available online.34 Since each of the collected patents
has different licensing terms and conditions, PatentCommons
still does not offer a comprehensive and easy-to-manage
contractual scheme.35
The diagram that follows summarizes what, in our view,
falls outside the label of “Open Patenting,” so as to identify the
boundaries of the Open Patenting phenomenon and move the
analysis a step further toward ascertaining what features
should be met in order to fall under that label.

pursues this strategy because it regards the risk of free riding as low, and it
wants to involve as many researchers as possible.
31. See The Patent Commons Project, LINUX FOUND., http://www.patent
commons.org/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2013).
32. See id.; see also Oliver Alexy & Markus G. Reitzig, Gaining It By
Giving It Away: Capturing Value in “Mixed” Appropriability Regimes (Feb. 24,
2010)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1430328.
33. See The Patent Commons Project, supra note 31.
34. Id. In practice, by using the repository set up by PatentCommons,
potential licensees can learn what patents are available under what
conditions, without engaging in cumbersome one-on-one negotiations.
35. This is also true of Eco-Patent Commons, which is a repository of
patent pledges that is specifically devoted to promoting sustainability. See Eco
Patent Commons FAQ, WBCD.ORG, http://www.wbcsd.org/work-program/
capacity-building/eco-patent-commons/ecopatentcommonsqa.aspx (last visited
Jan. 26, 2013).
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Patent Commons/
Eco-Patent Commons
Tropical Diseases
Initiative

Open Patenting

•
•
HapMap Project

Patented Innovations
A Licensing Scheme
Different from Traditional
Proprietary Contracts

Patent Public Foundation
Diagram. The Boundaries of the Open Patenting Phenomenon

II. STANDARDIZED TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR OPEN
PATENTING
So far we have set the boundaries of the Open Patenting
phenomenon as we conceive it by excluding what we see as not
belonging to it. Having set these “negative” limits, we proceed
to spell out the standard clauses that would transform a
conventional patent license into an “Open Patenting license.” In
order to do this, we analyze both the evidence from several real
experiences with Open Patenting (Part II.A) and the theoretical
models of defensive patent licenses that were proposed within
the aforementioned academic debate (Part II.B)—i.e., what
terms and conditions characterize the standard patent licenses
that have been employed in practice and theorized about in
literature. Then, we discuss why and to what extent these
examples meet or depart one from each other, so as to introduce
the reasons for our proposal and explain how it diverges from
the past examples.
A. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
One way of organizing the main Open Patenting
experiences that fall within our definition of Open Patenting is
to put them in a three-dimensional space with axes measuring
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how they “spread patented knowledge,” how they “pool it
together,” and how “they perform these two functions via the
establishment of an online structure.”36
One basic example of a legal tool that is employed to
spread patented knowledge is the “Yahoo! DomainKeys Patent
License Agreement v1.2.”37 The Agreement was developed by
Yahoo! and has been made available on a searchable website.
This allows third parties to freely use some of its patents on
hardware and software pursuant to standardized terms and
conditions. In particular, the Agreement states, “By attempting
to exercise any rights granted under this Agreement, Licensee
[i.e., those who will use Yahoo! patented hardware and
software] agrees to be bound by all the terms and conditions set
forth below, and subject to those terms and conditions, Licensee
may use the intellectual property described below.”38 What is
peculiar about this public offer to license is that: (1) third
parties accept the terms by doing nothing more than using
Yahoo!’s protected materials;39 (2) the standardized terms and
conditions hold for the sole patents that Yahoo! has chosen to
release and not for the many patents that the many firms
operating in the same industry (or scientific sector) have opted
to bestow; and (3) these protected materials are available to
anyone willing to use them (even independent researchers),
and not only to those that have previously decided to get
involved in a specific open project under the granting of their
own patents.

36. Multiple phenomena can fall under the label of “patent pool.” Some
examples include when a mutual exchange of patent rights takes place on a
bilateral or multilateral base, or when two or more patent owners form a
separate entity and assign or license specified patent rights to the entity. See
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK A. JANIS & MARK LEMLEY, IP AND ANTITRUST:
AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLE, at § 34.2 (Aspen 2004).
37. Yahoo!
DomainKeys
Patent
License
Agreement
v1.2,
SOURCEFORGE.NET,
http://domainkeys.sourceforge.net/license/patentlicense
1-2.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2013).
38. Id.
39. Id. (stating article 3.2 works as a disclosure and attribution clause
that establishes how users provide consent “to the terms and conditions of this
Agreement and in order to obtain a license to make, use, sell, offer for sale,
and/or import Implementations, [a user] must include, attach or preserve the
following prominently displayed statement in the source code and object code
of any such Implementations: ‘This code incorporates intellectual property
owned by Yahoo! and licensed pursuant to the Yahoo! DomainKeys Patent
License Agreement.’”).
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A similar license, developed within the field of biology is
the “BioBrickTM Public Agreement,”40 a free-to-use legal tool
allowing individuals, companies, and institutions to make their
standardized biological parts free for third parties to use.41
Here, however, the license—which is publicly available on a
centralized website—is to be used together with a repository of
the licensable materials (whether patented or not) which is also
publicly accessible.42 In particular, the BioBrick Public
Agreement encompasses two mirror agreements: (1) the
“Contributor Agreement”43 and (2) the “User Agreement.”44
Patent owners are those who subscribe to the former by
clicking the “Agree and Submit” button; in contrast, users—i.e.,
those who are interested in using the licensable materials—
subscribe to the latter by clicking the “Agree” button.
Pursuant to the Contributor Agreement, patent owners: (1)
permit users that receive their materials to use those materials
(e.g., patent owners would allow users to utilize DNA strings
encompassing both patented and not patentable elements); and
(2) the users irrevocably agree not to assert (or threaten to
assert) their patents (or other property rights) protecting those
materials.45 Moreover, under the Contributor Agreement,
contributors agree that the submitted materials may be
modified to include a BioBrick identification tag and the
biobricks.org/bpa URL.46 Conversely, per the User Agreement,
users: (1) acquire the right to use the granted materials; (2)
users understand that no fees will be charged for providing
access to, or use of, the materials, but that additional fees may
be charged for other activities (these activities include, but are
not limited to manufacturing and shipping of the materials and
consulting services on how to use the materials);47 and (3) users
also acknowledge attribution to the patentee.48 Nothing in
these contracts prevent contributors and users from voluntarily
40. The BioBrick Public Agreement, BIOBRICKS.ORG, https://biobricks.org/
bpa/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2013).
41. Id.
42. Id.
https://biobricks.org/bpa/
43. See
Contributors,
BIOBRICKS.ORG,
contributors/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2013).
44. See The BioBrick User Agreement, BIOBRICKS.ORG, https://biobricks.
org/bpa/users/agreement/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2013).
45. Contributors, supra note 43.
46. Id.
47. The BioBrick User Agreement, supra note 44.
48. Id.
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entering into separate agreements including third parties.
These agreements are valid as long as the agreements made
separately or with third parties regard materials other than
those contributed and received and do not diminish or derogate
the BioBrick Public Agreement.49
Accordingly, once a contributor signs the Contributor
Agreement, she enters into a contract with anyone who has
signed, or will later sign, the User Agreement.50 The end result
is that the contributor makes an irrevocable promise not to
assert any existing or future intellectual property rights
concerning the contributed material from all the users.51 In
return, users agree to comply with the requirements imposed
on them by the User Agreement.52 The BioBrick Public
Agreement realizes a mechanism of irrevocable offer that is
similar to the one implemented by Yahoo!. The only difference
between the two agreements is the addition of a real platform
(more than just a website where the license is available) and
the request of making an express acceptance of the license.53
Along the same line of thought, there are legal tools that
have been adopted to open up knowledge, or improve patented
knowledge. The most common example is the GreenXchange
(GX) project.54 The GX project was launched in 2009 by Science
Commons to promote sustainability by creating a platform for
the exchange of know-how and patents.55 At present, GX
project’s legal infrastructure is comprised of two different sets
of tools: 1) the specific tools which distinguish the GX project;
and 2) the general tools that, though tested within the GX
49. Id.; see also Contributors, supra note 43; The BioBrick Public
Agreement, supra note 40.
50. The BioBrick User Agreement, supra note 44; see also Contributors,
supra note 43.
51. Contributors, supra note 43.
52. The BioBrick User Agreement, supra note 44.
53. Id.; see also Yahoo! DomainKeys Patent License Agreement v.1.2, supra
note 37.
54. See Get Started, GREENXCHANGE, http://greenxchange.cc/ (last visited
Feb. 1, 2013); see also Ghafele & O’Brien, supra note 21 (discussing the GX
phenomenon).
55. Kaitlin Thaney, GreenXchange – a Project of Creative Commons, Nike
and Best Buy, CREATIVE COMMONS (Feb. 10, 2009) http://creative
commons.org/weblog/entry/12734 (funding provided by Nike, Best Buy,
Yahoo!, Mountain Equipment, Co-Op, IDEO, nGenera, 2Degrees,
Salesforce.com, University of Washington, Outdoor Industry Alliance, and
coordinated by Creative Commons).
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community, have been created by CC in order to facilitate the
use and trade of any kind of patent.56
As to the former, GX supplies three different kinds of
standardized pledges, namely: 1) the “standard option,”
currently adopted by two firms, where GX users obtain a
royalty-free license for commercial uses; 2) the “standard plus
option,” employed by five firms, where GX users pay for using
the patent under specific restrictions; and 3) the “research nonexempt option,” utilized by 456 firms.57 Here, GX users are
allowed to research, improve and adapt the licensed patents,
and then to patent the improvements for non-commercial uses.
Thus, while the standard and standard plus pledges provide a
path to commercialize the GX patents, the research non-exempt
option seeks to tackle the blocking effect that some patents may
produce to the detriment of follow-on innovation.58
As to the general legal tools developed by CC and tested
within the GX community, they fulfill an analogous objective:
to facilitate research and patent trade by providing full
disclosure of the available information and supply of
standardized licensing terms and conditions. Indeed, CC is
elaborating three different tools: (1) the “Research NonAssertion Pledge,”59 (2) the “Model Patent License,”60 and (3)
the “License Data Record.”61 The first two are contractual

56. See Patent Tools Public Discussion, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://wiki.
creativecommons.org/Patent_Tools_Public_Discussion (last updated Oct. 19,
2010).
57. GREENXCHANGE, http://www.greenxchange.cc/ (last visited Apr. 18,
2013).
58. The need for a research and experimentation exemption is
particularly urgent in the U.S. system. In contrast with foreign patent law
regimes, no statutory provision provides such shield from infringement. See
Janice M. Mueller, The Evanescent Experimental Use Exemption from United
States Patent Infringement Liability: Implications for University and Nonprofit
Research and Development, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 917, 927–56 (2004) (discussing
and analyzing the United States case law on the issue).
59. Research Non-Assertion Pledge, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://wiki.
creativecommons.org/Research_Non-Assertion_Pledge (last updated Oct. 19,
2010).
60. Model Patent License, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://wiki.creative
commons.org/Model_Patent_License (last modified Oct. 19, 2010).
61. Id. (“Together, the License Data Record and the Model Patent License
Agreement will be [sic] become your public license offer. When such an offer is
made available on your Web site, or through clearinghouses like GX, anyone
eligible to accept the offer may accept it through a registration and acceptance
process. As part of that process, the Licensee will supply the Licensee-specific
information needed to complete the License Data Record. This process, and
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schemes: they are suitable for patent holders who, respectively,
are interested in promoting basic research and making a public
offer to license their patents on standardized terms. Indeed, by
the Research Non-Assertion Pledge, patentees make a
revocable promise not to assert one or more of their patents
against any nonprofit institution engaging in a non-commercial
research use of them, but for the case when such an institution
would bring a legal infringement action against the
patentees.62 In contrast, the Model Patent License allows
patents that are being held for defensive purposes available for
other uses pursuant to reasonable and non-discriminatory
terms. Some terms, for instance, include provisions that if not
otherwise specified, are free of charge and without unnecessary
field limitations.63 Therefore, if such a standard model license
is available on a website, or through a clearinghouse like GX,
patent holders who adhere to it make the binding public offer
for one or more of their patents to morph into an effective
licensing contract once the user of the website or clearinghouse
accepts it. The License Data Record, instead, is a repository of
the main data regarding the patentees and licensees involved
in a specific project, like GX, which not only enables the
integration of those metadata with the major search engines,
software systems, and content creation systems, but also
supplies to the public a standardized description of the
available patents and of the clauses attached to them.64
Therefore, a patent holder who is interested in being involved
in the GX projects (or in other Internet-based Open Patenting
initiatives) fills in the License Data Record available on the
web, specifying whether she wants to change some terms and
conditions of the default Model Patent License, such as the
clauses concerning fees and royalties, fields of use limitations,
have made right limitations, and so on.65 Those interested in
applying for a patent under these terms have only to accept the
offer using the website to obtain a non-exclusive and non-

the transaction record, then completes the license agreement.”).
62. Research Non-Assertion Pledge, supra note 59.
63. Model Patent License, supra note 60.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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transferable66 license to make, use, sell, offer for sale, and
import products, services, and processes embodying the patent.
In addition to being better articulated than those
developed by Yahoo! and BioBrick, the legal tools provided by
GX and CC realize the same mechanism of spreading patented
knowledge by (almost) irrevocable offers addressing everybody
who is interested in using the released patents. Thus far, in the
three experiences analyzed, licensees are not required to offer
any intellectual property rights in exchange for the ones that
they obtain by accepting the public offer.
Though built on many of the mechanisms provided by the
above-analyzed legal tools, the BiOS67 initiative goes further by
adding to its standard license a “pooling feature.” The “pooling
feature” imposes on licensees an obligation to give licensors
“something back” in exchange for the patents that they have
previously granted.68
The initiative was set up by CAMBIA, an independent,
non-profit Australian research institute.69 BiOS establishes a
legal framework that enables access to some biotechnological
technologies and facilitating their development. Related to this
purpose, BiOS makes available a world-wide, non-exclusive,
royalty-free, non-assertion license both to make and use the
granted technology and to license back its improvements either
for commercial or non-commercial uses.70 For instance, BiOS
offers two BiOS-compatible agreements regarding “health

66. Id. (“Licensee may not assign any of its rights under this Agreement,
delegate any of its obligations under this Agreement, or otherwise transfer
this Agreement, without the prior written consent of Licensor, and any
attempted assignment, transfer, or delegation shall be voidable by Licensor.
Any change of control of Licensee shall be deemed an attempted transfer of
this Agreement. Licensor may assign this Agreement in connection with a
sale, merger, or transfer of the assets to which this Agreement relates,
provided that the assignee assumes all rights and obligations under this
Agreement.”).
67. See The CAMBIA BiOS Initiative: Biological Innovation for Open
Society, CAMBIA, 2–3, http://www.cambia.org.au/daisy/bios/10/version/live/
part/4/data (last updated Jan. 1, 2004) [hereinafter The CAMBIA BiOS
Initiative].
68. See Andrés Guadamuz Gonzáles, Open Science: Open Source Licenses
in Scientific Research, 7 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 321, 339–45 (2006).
69. CAMBIA,
http://www.cambia.org.au/daisy/cambia/home.html
(last
visited Feb. 26, 2013); see also Gonzáles, supra note 68 (describing the work of
CAMBIA).
70. The CAMBIA BiOS Initiative, supra note 67.
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technologies” and “plant molecular enabling technologies.”71
The former allows patentees to give permission to use their
technology without requiring royalties or imposing other
conditions that could disfavor the production of goods and
services involving the technology in question.72 The latter
requires users to agree to not appropriate the fundamental core
of the technology and to license back its improvements to
whoever contributed to their development.73 In other words, as
a confirmation of the BiOS’s pooling feature, BiOS-compatible
standard contracts establish a system of cross-licensing where
what is licensed is not only the base technology, but also its
improvements which—to be precise—must be shared with
anyone that supports their development. As a result, we can
consider BiOS as a means to create a kind of “fenced commons”
for all the improvements of the technologies granted under the
BiOS-compatible agreements.
Subsequently, the sharing and pooling activities are
conducted through a website where a repository of patents is
available under BiOS-compatible agreements.74 The patents
are then supplied through a correlated website where the
licensing agreements are made available.75 Therefore, anyone
who is interested in getting one of these technologies may first
search the repository and then contact the BiOS Initiative
Administrator in order to negotiate her entry within the pool.
Of course, this is dependent upon whether the individual is
given entry according to the standardized terms and conditions
of the BiOS-agreements. Indeed, entry will entail the signature
of a specific “BiOS-compatible agreement” according to the kind
of “IP and technologies”76 the prospective licensee is interested
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. BiOS, CAMBIA, http://www.cambia.org/daisy/bios/home.html (last
visited Feb. 26, 2013).
75. Id.
76. See The CAMBIA “Biological Open Source” (BiOS) License for Plant
Enabling Technologies Version 1.5, CAMBIA, at C, http://www.cambia.org/
daisy/bios/mta/agreement-patented.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2013)
(“LICENSOR owns or is the licensee of certain Enabling Technologies and
associated patents, patent applications, knowhow, data, materials, and
business, technical, economical and manufacturing information (the “IP &
Technology”)); CAMBIA DRAFT Health Technologies BiOS 2.0 Agreement,
CAMBIA, at C, http://www.cambia.org/daisy/bios/mta/agreement-patented.html
(last visited Apr. 24, 2013); CAMBIA DRAFT PMET BiOS 2.0 Agreement,
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in, a “BiOS Mutual Non-Assertion Agreement,”77 and a “BiOS
Technology Support and Material Transfer Agreement.”78 The
latter is purposely meant to regulate, among other things, the
case when the website offers technological support to the
licensee, who, if is a for-profit entity, will be charged. In this
case, then all the features of the above legal tools are available,
with the addition of the license back mechanisms for
improvements.
A potentially more influential sharing and pooling feature
is retrievable in the Open Invention Network (OIN).79 OIN is a
company which some OSS distributors and more traditional IT
companies created in order to improve the applications for, and
components of, the Linux operating system. Specifically, OIN
can be considered a proper online pool that encompasses a large
number of software patents licensed under standardized terms
and conditions.80 On the one hand, software patentees, besides
granting to OIN “a royalty-free, worldwide, nonexclusive, nontransferable license” for making, having made, using,
importing, and distributing their patent in relation to any
Linux System;81 and committing themselves to a “not
challenging clause,” that is, not asserting their patent against
the Linux operating system, or certain Linux-related
applications,82 they are also obligating themselves to a “viral
clause” that establishes that OIN patents cannot be assigned or
licensed unless the assignment or the license are made subject

CAMBIA, at C, http://www.cambia.org/daisy/bios/mta/agreement-patented.html
(last visited Apr. 24, 2013).
77. See generally BiOS Mutual Non-Assertion Agreement, CAMBIA,
http://www.cambia.org/daisy/bios/mta/agreement-patented.html (last visited
Apr. 24, 2013).
78. See id.
OPEN
INVENTION
NETWORK,
http://www.openinvention
79. See
network.com/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2013).
80. See id.
81. License Agreement, OPEN INVENTION NETWORK (May 1, 2012),
http://www.openinventionnetwork.com/pat_license_agreement.php.
82. Id. This type of clause is also named “patent peace” or “retaliation”
clause. It may further provide that the license will terminate if the licensee
initiates “litigation (including a cross-claim or counterclaim in a lawsuit)
alleging that any patent claim is infringed by making, using, selling, offering
for sale, or importing the program or a part of it.” GNU General Public
License, GNU (June 29, 2007), http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html. This
clause is from the 3.0 version of GPL, released in June 2007, which obliges
OSS developers not to question the validity of the original copyright on the
OSS products. Id.
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to the terms of the OIN license.83 On the other hand, OIN
grants to each patentee and other licensee a royalty-free,
worldwide, nonexclusive, non-transferable license to make,
have made, use, import, and distribute products or services
involving OIN patents, including those patents that OIN has
autonomously acquired or has received as donation.84 As a
whole, OIN works as a central administrator by creating a
patent pool where patents, gathered in a repository, are both
less expensive and easier to manage than proprietary ones.85 In
addition, by requiring licensees to maintain open the patented
knowledge by licensing it to the same conditions they have
received it, OIN creates a mechanism capable of adding to the
traditional defensive function that pools have: that of spreading
patented knowledge.
B. THEORETICAL MODELS
In the last few months Jason Schultz together with
Jennifer M. Urban, and David L. Hayes together with C. Eric
83. License Agreement, supra note 81; see also François Lévêque & Yann
Ménière, Copyright Versus Patents: The Open Source Software Legal Battle, 4
REV. ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 27, 42 (2007) (observing that
published discoveries can loosen the novelty requirement for patenting but
still can be captured in proprietary formats); Donna M. Gitter, Resolving the
Open Source Paradox in Biotechnology: A Proposal for a Revised Open Source
Policy for Publicly Funded Genomic Databases, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1475, 1478
(2007) (highlighting that the project is vulnerable to parasitic patenting).
Actually, some OSS licensing agreements provide the sole “attribution-only”
clause, whereby third parties can freely deploy and use the OSS products as
long as they attribute them to their originators. Greg R. Vetter, Commercial
Free and Open Source Software: Knowledge Production, Hybrid
Appropriability, and Patents, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2087, 2091 (2009). In fact,
for these communities the shame for appropriating the “paternity” of someone
else’s creation is a deterrent sufficient to prevent third parties from closing up
the OSS products for private gains. Id. at 2095. Yet, when the Berkeley
Software Distribution (BSD) license was released without the viral clause,
Microsoft used parts of a BSDed code in XP and some other product, and
distributed them through the traditional “all rights reserved” licensing model,
the only condition being that it acknowledged that it had used a BSDed
product. Even more interesting is the case of Apple, whose operating system
relies on the Darwin Open Source project that does not impose any viral
condition. JONATHAN LEVIN, MAC OS X AND IOS INTERNALS: TO THE APPLE’S
CORE 3–16 (2013). The innovation added by Apple is in the users’ interface,
where Apple does not have competitors.
84. License Agreement, supra note 81.
85. See Open Invention Network’s Currently Owned Patents, OPEN
INVENTION NETWORK, http://www.openinventionnetwork.com/pat_owned.php
(last visited Feb. 26, 2013).
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Schulman, have elaborated two different kinds of standardized
patent licenses to enhance Open Innovation, namely the
Defensive Patent License (DPL) and the Modified Defensive
Patent License (MDPL).86
Both of them are worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive,
not-sub-licensable licenses to make, have made,87 use, sell, offer
for sale, import, and distribute88 products embodying the
licensed patent, and also services in the case of the MDPL.89
Moreover, they both envisage a website where licensing
transactions should take place via the posting of
announcements and under a centralized administrator90 in
charge of keeping track of participants and transactions.91
Therefore, once one DPL/MDPL user—i.e., one who decides to
adhere to these licensing schemes—has posted on such
websites offering announcements regarding the whole
portfolio92 of her current and, in the sole case of DPL, future
patents, other DPL/MDPL users accessing the site could accept
one or more offers and, thus, become effective licensees of the
patents under a bilateral license. Indeed, in both scenarios
depicted by such models, the site works as a vehicle enabling
the creation of a web of bilateral agreements that otherwise
86. See generally Hayes & Schulman, supra note 3.
87. Actually, the MDPL deals with the “have made right” with more care.
Since MDPL regulates cases of “clone products or services” (i.e., those
including “substantially identical functionality of all or a commercially
substantial portion of a prior-released product”) as well as “foundry services or
products” (i.e. those “manufactured by [a] [l]icensee for or on behalf of, a
specific third party, using designs or specifications received in a substantially
completed form from that third party, for resale or relicense to or on behalf of
that third party . . . .”), MDPL limits “have made rights” to the case where the
design and specifications are furnished by the licensee in a substantially
completed form to the manufacture who fully adheres to the design and
specification so furnished and who transfers the products to the licensee on
whose behalf those products were made. Id. at app. I.
88. The MDPL also includes the right to operate. Id. at app. I, art 2.1(a).
89. For the DPL, see Schultz & Urban, supra note 3, at app. I, art 2.1. For
the MDPL, see Hayes & Schulman, supra note 3, at app. I, art 2.1(a).
90. While the DPL central administration provides services that are free
of charge, Hayes and Schulman do not address this feature. Hayes &
Schulman, supra note 3, at app. I, art 2.1(a).
91. With the difference that the MDPL encompasses an ameliorating
version of the centralized administration by requiring that a website
representative countersigns each DPL taking place between users.
92. Seemingly, the MDPL definition is further carved out according to the
existing licensing that is in place at the time of the offering announcement, as
long as they have been signed in bona fide agreement with, and not for the
purpose of avoiding, the DPL grant.
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would not be signed due to the lack of disclosure as to the
respective inventions, the high transaction costs regarding the
negotiation of agreements, and the duty to pay royalties for
using the patented knowledge in question.
In regards to fostering Open Innovation, both the DPL and
the MDPL are designed to create “innovation-friendly
environments” protected from patent claims; indeed, both
contain a “not-challenging clause,” whereby a licensee must
forgo any offensive patent claims against other DPL users or
risk revocation of that DPL license by the licensor.93 Under the
MDPL, the offender must be given thirty days via a written
notice to withdraw her claim.94 In particular, the protective
nature of both the DPL and MDPL environments emerges
significantly when looking at the rules presiding over the
management of inbound and outbound relationships—i.e., the
relationships that a DPL/MDPL user has, respectively, with
other DPL/MDPL users or with non-DPL/MDPL users.
Interestingly, whereas the former relationships are
characterized by reciprocity, the latter are not subject to the
viral clauses that are the central feature of the main Open
Innovation schemes, such as OSS and CC.
The reciprocal commitment to mutually open up owned
patents that characterizes DPL/MDPL’s inbound relationships
derives from the above-mentioned web of bilateral agreements,
which are generated by the offer of whole patent portfolios on
one side and the acceptance and use of specific patents by the
other.95 In other words, the licensing mechanism supported by
the DPL and MDPL is limited to those patentees who, by
adhering to one of the two schemes, have chosen to inhabit the
“protected environment.” Neither of the regimes imposes on
their users the duty to license out their patents under the same
conditions that they have already followed to license them in;
rather, they allow “proprietary licensing” to coexist with “open
licensing” as long as the former governs outbound relationships
and the latter governs inbound ones96 (i.e., at any time DPL

93. Hayes & Schulman, supra note 3, at 9.
94. Id.
95. See Schultz & Urban, supra note 3, at 39 (“The DPL operates by
creating a set of viral, bilateral obligations . . . .”).
96. See Hayes & Schulman, supra note 3, at 3 (“A DPL Participant can
individually license non-DPL users . . . .”); see also id. at app. I, art. 1.12
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users can independently license and pursue royalties against
any non-DPL user97). Likewise, MDPL users who have signed
exclusive licenses with non-MDPL users before adhering to the
MDPL are not forced to interrupt them.98 In sum, these
schemes do not provide anything equivalent to a viral
condition. Their efforts to spur Open Innovation appear to be
focused on the creation of a “fenced environment” where Open
Innovation is safely possible, rather than being focused on the
spreading of patented knowledge among whoever could be
interested in it.
What the DPL and MDPL do share is the nature of their
licensing and the environments they create in terms of
centralized administration, procedures, and protection; yet the
two schemes diverge significantly as to the effects of the
discontinuation notice whereby DPL/MDPL users revoke their
involvement. Though both schemes make the revocation of
DPLs and MDPLs effective after six-months notice, under the
DPL regime the revocation concerns only future patents (i.e.,
those patents filed or acquired after the “discontinuation
date”);99 discontinuation under the MDPL releases the whole
portfolio previously licensed thereunder.100 Hence, the DPL is
an irrevocable and perpetual license as to the patent portfolio
existing at the moment of entry and born during the
participation period, while for future patents it works as a
revocable and temporary commitment.101 On the contrary,
under the MDPL regime all licenses automatically terminate at
the end of the notice period.102 In other words, after the notice
period the participant who withdraws can return substantially

(allowing MDPL licensors to make licensing agreements outside of the MDPL,
subject to some restrictions).
97. Schultz & Urban, supra note 3, at 40.
98. Hayes & Schulman, supra note 3, at app. I, art. 1.11.
99. The discontinuation date is six months after the date of the
discontinuation announcement. Schultz & Urban, supra note 3, at 57.
100. For the differences between DPL and MDPL patent license revocation,
see Hayes & Schulman, supra note 3, at 6 (explaining that allowing, in the
MDPL, the withdrawal of both inbound and outbound licenses enables the
withdrawn participant to automatically return to the “pre-participation
licensing state,” while this is not permitted to the DPL user, as the license
sticks to the granted patent for its whole lifetime—in other words, the MDPL
would be a “non-sticky” version of the DPL).
101. See Schultz & Urban, supra note 3, at 57 (“[A] DPL user may always
cease offering future patents under the DPL, but must honor existing
commitments.”).
102. Hayes & Schulman, supra note 3, at 6.
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to her pre-participation status, the only alteration being losing
the right to seek past damages against other MDPL users.103
According to the scholars that conceived the schemes, the
above differences find a justification in the types of entities that
they want to involve in such “fenced environments.”104 Whereas
the DPL runs the risk of only appealing to small and medium
companies with the promise of being part of a decentralized,
large proprietary defensive portfolio whose costs and benefits
are distributed across its users, the MDPL seeks to engage big
stakeholders by modifying some of the DPL’s clauses that
would be too risky for them (such as the irrevocable and
perpetual nature of the DPL grant). In particular, given the
network effects that such environments are likely to generate,
the MDPL aims at having large and established companies
involved to achieve enough scale to “cover” the whole industry
or economic sector.105 The two schemes do not aim at fostering
Open Innovation via the spreading of patented knowledge;
rather, they support Open Innovation by assuming that the
innovation-friendly environments that they create will grow
thanks to their own economic profitability and the network
effects that they will trigger.
C. MATCHING EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE WITH THEORETICAL
EXERCISES
Drawing on the comparison between practical Open
Patenting experiences and the theoretical models, it emerges
that “Open Innovation” as such can be achieved in different
ways: by spreading patented knowledge, as happens whenever
a patentee offers, under some standardized terms and
conditions, her patents to whoever might be interested in using
them (as it materializes in some of the empirical experiences
here considered);106 or by pooling patented knowledge, as
occurs whenever a patentee, within a standardized contractual

103. Id. (“[P]ast damages will no longer exist between both inbound and
outbound between DPL members and the withdrawn PDL member for the
period of mutual participation.”).
104. See, e.g., id. at 5 (describing how the DPL better benefits entities with
few or no patents).
105. Id. at 6 (“This modification to make the DPL non-sticky may facilitate
broader adoption . . . by making it more palatable to more companies. In
addition, this modification makes the DPL substantially less risky . . . .”).
106. See Empirical Evidence discussion supra Part II.A.
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scheme, cross-licenses her patents in exchange for someone
else’s patents (as it is envisaged in the theoretical models).107
Because of these different perspectives, the practical
experiences and the theoretical models here discussed show
several convergences and divergences in the terms and
conditions that they provide as well as in the structures chosen
to implement them.
As to the convergences, both the empirical experiences and
the theoretical models operate as bazaars where patents are
put up for trade. In this way they become open repositories that
guarantee transparency and ease of access to the existing
patented knowledge.108 Moreover, they all adopt non-assertion
commitments whereby patentees and licensees may work in a
“safe environment,” without being challenged for innovative
activities that may infringe third parties’ patents.109 This
results in the flourishing of innovative processes that allow
users the freedom to operate and innovate.
However, one of the divergent features of these safe
environments rests with the dissimilar way in which the
opened patents (i.e., those patents covered by the non-assertion
commitment) are granted to the other parties. The empirical
evidence shows that, in practice, patentees grant single patents
(current and future ones, at least where required) on a standalone basis,110 while in the theoretical models patentees must
grant their entire patent portfolios, including, at least in the
case of the DPL, future patents.111
In the DPL and MDPL, such an onerous commitment is
counterbalanced by a right of revocation that is broader than
the one available in the Open Patenting projects described
herein. Indeed, whereas DPL and MDPL can be withdrawn
with six-months’ notice,112 more often the empirical projects

107. See DPL/MDPL discussion supra Part II.B.
108. Schultz & Urban, supra note 3, at 41 (“The DPL thus . . . reward[s]
participation with the benefits of unfettered access to the patents of other DPL
users and freedom to operate with respect to DPL technologies.”).
109. See, e.g., Hayes & Schulman, supra note 3, at 18 (detailing right of
MDPL Licensor to revoke license of licensee if she asserts offensive patent
infringement claim); Schultz & Urban, supra note 3, at 40 (similar right under
DPL); Contributors, supra note 43 (“[Contributors] make an irrevocable
promise not to assert against [Users] any existing or future intellectual
property rights concerning [Contributor’s] contributed part.”).
110. See, e.g., supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 99–103 and accompanying text.
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require irrevocable commitments.113 As a result, while in
practice open patent licenses are likely to be perpetual (i.e.,
thought to last until the expiration of the patents in question),
the DPL is perpetually binding only in connection to the
patents already existing when the patentee adopted the license,
while the MDPL is effectively never perpetual in relation to
existing or future patents.
The reason for such different ways of formulating the
trade-off between what is granted and the right to opt out via
the revocation mechanisms lays in the additional purposes that
both practical experiences and theoretical models seek to
achieve. In principle, all schemes, either practical or
theoretical, aim at creating a “safe environment,” shielding
users against someone else’s assertion of infringement on his or
her rights. However, DPL and MDPL also share the additional
purpose of navigating the patent thicket regarding technologies
requiring multiple patents, particularly with the MDPL aimed
at involving big players’ portfolios.114 On the other hand, each
of the analyzed Open Patenting experiences presents different
additional purposes, including merely “opening up” software
and hardware patents (Yahoo!),115 pooling together and
fostering the development of basic research tools (BiOS and
BioBrick),116 promoting the development of open source projects
(OIN),117 finding business application for paper patents (GX),118
and commercializing services and further activities
surrounding the granted patents (GX and BioBrick).119 In
contrast, the theoretical models allow commercialization of the
granted patents only outside the safe environment (i.e., when a
license for commercial exploitation of a patent conferred into
the safe environment is signed between the patentee and a
third party not belonging to that environment).120
113. See, e.g., discussion supra Part II.A.
114. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
115. Yahoo! DomainKeys Patent License Agreement v1.2, supra note 37.
116. The BioBrick Public Agreement, supra note 40 (this Agreement was
“developed for sharing the uses of standardized genetically encoded
functions”).
117. See OINsm, OPEN INVENTION NETWORK, http://www.openinvention
network.com/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2013) (“Open source software development
has been one of the greatest sources of innovation.”).
118. GREENXCHANGE, supra note 57.
119. See id.
120. See, e.g., Schultz & Urban, supra note 3, at 38 (licensing of a DPL
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This diversity of purposes is evidence that while theoretical
models apply to current or prospective patent portfolio holders
that, on the basis of reciprocity, explicitly agree to enter into the
safe environment, empirical experiences tend to involve any
innovator who is interested in the project and shares its
purpose—an innovator who, by the mere use of the patent
conferred into the safe environment, becomes an implicit
licensee. This innovator is then obliged, on a viral basis, to
maintain the same licensing conditions for the products
developed by using that license.
Interestingly, the above-mentioned divergence as to the
ways an opened patent can be granted, coupled with the
differences as to whom the practical and theoretical initiatives
are addressed on the bases of either virality or reciprocity,
contribute to differently designed safe environments. Both the
DPL and MDPL create an online pool among all the patentees
who agree to cross-license their patents with the same terms
and conditions, as long as these terms and conditions are
respected.121 Given the non-exclusive nature of the DPL and
MDPL, this safe environment is assumed to coexist with the
more familiar outside environment where patents are
traditionally traded and licensed against fees. Therefore, the
DPL and MDPL raise a fence around the safe environments
that they create—leading to different rules not only diversely
governing exploitation of patents inside and outside of this
“fenced environment,” but also disparately affecting innovation
which, in the case of the “fenced environment,” will be available
only to those inside it. On the contrary, practice shows that the
less structured Open Patenting experiences design a safe
environment which, thanks to the viral clause, is intended to
exponentially spread the more the granted patents are used by
interested parties.122 In other words, these empirical
experiences create an “unfenced environment” which works as
a booster for innovation.
Now assuming that the Open Patenting experiences, as
well as the theoretical licensing schemes here analyzed, are
thought to spur Open Innovation by increasing the number of
patents that patentees will be incentivized to open up, it is
interesting to consider how these fenced and unfenced
patent is done on a “royalty-free basis”).
121. See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text (discussing how the
website for the DPL regime would operate).
122. See Empirical Evidence discussion, supra part II.A.
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environments work in relation to this purpose. First, the DPL
and MDPL will probably succeed only when the number of
patentees that take part in these pools amount to the “right
scale.” Indeed, if either framework lacks the numbers to reach
such a scale, there are no incentives to participate in the
projects because the network effects are not sufficient for the
desired end of navigating the patent thicket. On the contrary,
the practical experiences are not concerned by such right scale
and network effects issues because, as long as they adopt a
viral clause, they succeed even when only one single licensee
adopts the open terms and conditions of the initial irrevocable
offer that she has accepted. Therefore, while in the DPL and
MDPL scenarios patentees’ willingness to open up their patents
will rest on the number of patents that already reside within
the “fenced environment,” in the “unfenced environments”
created by the practical experiences here analyzed, the
willingness to open will not even be at stake, because the viral
clause will oblige future patentees to license their subsequent
patents under open licenses.
Nonetheless, the success of Open Patenting licenses
characterized by viral clauses should not be taken for granted,
especially when the open project pursues an ambitious goal:
involving firms holding crucial and very valuable patents. It is
likely that these players would not be interested in making an
irrevocable offer as to opening their patents without at least
gaining their rivals’ intellectual property rights in exchange. It
is in relation to this scenario that the MDPL model could work
as an effective tool for supporting Open Innovation.
Finally, as to the divergent structures that these
theoretical and practical models adopt, it is important to note
that the former rely on a central administrator, who manages
the website and the flow of inbound and outbound patents and
keeps track of the many transactions that occur within the safe
environment.123 On the contrary, the management of Open
123. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. A similar experience,
though too recent to be included in the analysis, is the consortium launched by
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), in collaboration with Bio
Ventures for Global Health in the field of pharmaceutical products for
neglected diseases, to which some major pharmaceutical companies have
already granted some of their patents. See Guiding Principles of WIPO
Re:Search, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/research/en/about/guiding_principles
.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2013). The aim of the initiative is that of
encouraging and supporting research and development of products for
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Patenting initiatives ranges from use of a hub-and-spoke
administrator, as in the OIN project,124 to the case of a mere
facilitator as with the platform envisaged by BioBrick and
BiOS projects,125 and to the Model Patent License elaborated by
CC as a tool not necessarily administrated by a third party but
simply offered to whoever wants to utilize it (and adopted,
indeed, by the GX project).126
D. OUR PROPOSAL
Building on our primary definition of Open Patenting and
on the analysis of empirical experiences and theoretical models,
our proposal intends to design a licensing scheme capable of
promoting Open Innovation. Such a scheme mirrors the MPL,
as it attempts to provide a simple legal tool, but additionally
aims at guaranteeing a higher degree of flexibility to satisfy
needs and features specific to as many industrial niches and
sectors as possible. While the tool is meant to address all
patentees regardless of the size and value of their portfolios
and the industrial sectors where they operate, and though it is
likely to be employed by governments for public-funded
initiatives, private-public partnerships, small and medium
enterprise firms, and niche sectors, we hope that its
customization will also incentivize “big players” to open up
their patents.
We propose that patentees interested in spreading their
patented knowledge employ an irrevocable,127 worldwide,128

neglected diseases by establishing a platform through which public and
private sector entities can share their IPRs. Id. It has three major components:
(1) a database providing details on the IPRs available for licensing as well as
services and their technologies available; (2) a “Partnership Hub” which will
work as an administrator of all information and licensing partners available;
and (3) a range of specific “Supporting Activities” to facilitate negotiation and
to address technical matters. Id. What is peculiar about this initiative is that
members commit to the licensing of their IPRs under specific terms, which
are, however, subject to individual negotiation. See id. In other words, licenses
are the results of one-to-one bargaining activities within a set of standard
terms and conditions, encompassing, among other things, commitments to not
appropriate the patentable results of the common research and to not assert
their own IPRs against the other members of the consortium. See id.
124. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 40–53, 67–78 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 60–66 and accompanying text.
127. This means that the license will last until the expiration date of the
patent.
128. Of course, the geographic scope of the license cannot be broader than
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non-exclusive, no-charge license, to ensure that the use of third
parties’ patents will never become, in any part of the world, an
infringing activity for whoever chooses to become a licensee. In
other words, our licensing scheme consists of a unilateral
standard offer that would be implicitly accepted whenever
someone uses the licensed patent.
Furthermore, in order to encourage its adoption, our
proposal, like the other already existing open licenses (such as
General Public License, Creative Commons, and the Model
Patent License), does not charge the patentees and licensees
fees additional to the ones required by ordinary patent systems.
Our licensing scheme has been conceptualized to work without
the help of any centralized administrator. To be sure, the lack
of such an agent may raise concerns as to where would-be
licensees could find information about the available patents
and their features. Yet, the empirical experiences show that in
some sectors, such as biotechnologies, there is a natural trend
toward the creation of repositories to ease access and sharing of
knowledge. Therefore, it is likely that, in order to spread
needed information among would-be licensees, our licensing
scheme will have to build upon this continuing trend and put
those experiences to use. Moreover, given that our licensing
scheme is an online tool, an easier way to solve the described
information problem is inserting metadata to make it not only
machine readable, but also searchable via search engines. This
solution, which is the one actually adopted by CC, as well as
proposed for the MPL and the BioBrick public agreement,
requires only the existence of a website performing as a “tag
generator.”129
The difference between the current open licensing schemes
already envisaged and available on the web and our system
rests with the possibility for patentees to customize their offer.
Indeed, where our proposal contravenes is in giving patentees
the freedom to tailor the license that they adopt according to
their will and to the features of the industrial sectors where
they operate. This is done by maintaining a core of
unchangeable clauses, guaranteeing the openness of the
license, but leaving patentees free to choose among a pre-

the scope of the granted patent. Therefore, if the patentee holds a national
patent, the license herein proposed will be national as well.
129. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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determined set of clauses that will customize the license if the
patentee so desires. Namely, we believe that attribution, nonassertion, and viral clauses should be compulsory in order to
ensure the openness of the license; we would also maintain, at
patentee’s discretion, the choice of whether to allow commercial
exploitation of the granted patent, the charging of royalties
according to the uses chosen by the licensee, and the use of the
patent for producing substitute goods.130 In addition, another
compulsory clause should state that the use of the licensed
patent for research purposes is always royalty-free.131
As to the justification for the compulsory clauses,
attribution is needed to remove what could be a possible hurdle
to the use of our license. Indeed, in the case of public or
nonprofit research institutions, researchers could be interested
in maintaining credit for what they have invented—a result
that would not be possible with the adoption of a share-alike,
non-attribution license. In a different vein, the non-assertion
pledge and the viral clauses are essential in keeping the license
open. First, the non-assertion pledge guarantees the creation of
a safe environment where operating and innovating are not
infringing activities and there is no risk of misappropriation.
Second, such a safe environment will keep expanding by the
effect of the viral clause, which prevents the building of fences
around these open patents. In addition, use of a viral clause
overcomes the need to adopt other clauses, such as those
regarding grant-backs and sub-licenses. Indeed, with the viral
clause, there is no need to further regulate improvements and
additional licenses because they will be subject to the same
terms and conditions of our licensing scheme. Finally, we

130. This is, for example, what happens in GX, where patentees can choose
to allow commercial uses in fields other than the primary market of
exploitation of the patent that is offered under the GX license. Cf. Hayes &
Schulman, supra note 3, at 9 (proposing a carve-out from the MDPL for
“cloning” products and services and also “foundry” products and services, on
the ground that “participants may be concerned about wholesale product
copying [or] circumvention of the DPL’s purpose by an entity set up solely or
principally to launder products through a DPL member”).
131. As already mentioned, the lack of a statutory research exemption
constitutes a significant difference among U.S. patent law and those of the
main foreign jurisdictions. See Patent Tools Public Discussion, supra note 56.
See also Chris Dent et al., Research Use of Patented Knowledge: A Review
(Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev. Directorate for Sci., Tech. & Indus.,
Working Paper No. 2006/2, 2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/science/
scienceandtechnologypolicy/36311146.pdf.
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believe that research should be royalty-free to promote the
cumulative nature of innovative processes.
Moving now to the options that in our proposal are granted
to patentees in relation to commercial uses of their patents,
patentees shall first decide whether to allow commercial
exploitation in general. Once the choice for commercial
exploitation is made, patentees shall decide which uses are
permitted and whether they should be charged and, finally,
they would set ranges of royalties. In particular, in the
customizable part of their offer, patentees shall decide whether
to permit, and, once permitted, whether to charge for: (1) uses
in other fields; (2) follow-on uses (i.e., uses that will not result
in competitive products); and (3) substitute uses (i.e., uses that
will result in competitive products). This articulation of uses in
three main categories derives from the need to involve as many
players as possible, including big patent portfolio holders,
across as many industrial sectors as possible. In particular,
holders of valuable patents can shield profits they generate by
choosing to not allow substitute and follow-on uses, but they
can increase their patent cash-flow by monetizing uses in other
fields that they would be unlikely to pursue on their own.
In sum, we believe that Open Patenting is not strictly a noprofit choice, but can be a choice for non-profit research. In
practicing within our framework, a patentee cannot choose to
charge for the research uses of his or her patents, but he or she
can choose whether to profit from their possible commercial
uses. In other words, while openness and profit can go together,
and should do so to involve as many stakeholders as possible—
specifically those active in profit-driven sectors—research
should remain not only free (like free speech), but also royaltyfree. This will enhance innovation without depleting the
economic incentives to innovate. We believe that legal rules are
not supposed to shape innovative paths within industry, but to
help innovators find their way. Therefore, our intent is not to
change industry dynamics, especially in traditional sectors
where the incentives to keep patents closed are, unfortunately,
very significant.
III. CONCLUSION
In this paper we built on the initial definition of Open
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Patenting as a legal phenomenon establishing standardized
terms and conditions for managing patented knowledge132 in
order to identify the clauses that an Open Patenting standard
license should encompass to effectively foster Open Innovation.
To this aim, we matched the current main Open Patenting
experiences with the theoretical licensing schemes that have
been envisaged in literature in the pursuit of using patents in a
way different from traditional proprietary notions, in the
attempt to align them to the Open Innovation principles.
What emerged from the analysis of the Open Patenting
empirical experiences and the theoretical schemes belonging to
the Open Innovation environment is that while the former
achieve the goals of spreading and pooling patented
knowledge—goals that, of course, each achieves to a different
extent—the latter aim at promoting freedom to operate and
innovate as well as the ability to navigate the patent thicket
among the inner circle of licensors and licensees. In our
opinion, although belonging to the same environment, practical
and theoretical models do not coincide in the way in which they
intend to foster the Open Innovation phenomenon since they
have different visions of how patented knowledge should be
opened up and what parties should benefit from openness. In
particular, if the theoretical models are conceived for the pool of
participants in the project, the practical experiences—or at
least some of them—address a more broad range of users of the
patented knowledge. As a result of these differences, we have
highlighted that the safe environment that both theoretical and
practical models aim at establishing is a “fenced” one in the
first case—as Open Innovations takes place only inside the
environment but not outside—and an “unfenced” one in the
second case—as the Open Innovation is meant to spread as
much as possible from the inside towards the outbound.133
With this background, we proceeded to formulate a
proposal for a standard Open Patenting license that, in the
pursuit of Open Innovation, would eliminate the difference
between fenced and unfenced environments, yet would at the
same time take into account the specificities of certain
industrial sectors. These are the specificities that drove the
formulation of the theoretical models, such as, for example, the
need to attract big players holding valuable patents.

132. Maggiolino & Montagnani, supra note 2.
133. See discussion supra Part II.C.
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We propose that this is possible by adopting a license that
combines a high degree of standardization and is meant for any
inventor, regardless of his or her capacity of conferring patents,
with the option of tailoring some license conditions to the will of
patentees and the needs of specific sectors. In other words, a
license that is standard as to the core, mandatory conditions—
i.e., those conditions that guarantee the spread of knowledge—
but is elective as to the conditions that would enable patentees
to take into account field specificities and individual needs,
such as the conditions regarding commercial and chargeable
uses of patents. Without jeopardizing the spread of knowledge,
such a license might permit patentees to maintain a degree of
control of their patents sufficient to encourage them to open up
their patented knowledge in an unfenced environment.

